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Abstract
Once an email problem, spam has nowadays branched into new territories with
disruptive effects. In particular, spam has established itself over the recent years
as a ubiquitous, annoying, and sometimes threatening aspect of online social net-
works. Due to its prevalent existence, many works have tackled spam on Twitter
from different angles. Spam is, however, a moving target. The new generation of
spammers on Twitter has evolved into online creatures that are not easily recog-
nizable by old detection systems. With the strong tangled spamming community,
automatic tweeting scripts, and the ability to massively create Twitter accounts
with a negligible cost, spam on Twitter is becoming smarter, fuzzier and harder
to detect. Our own analysis of spam content on Arabic trending hashtags in Saudi
Arabia results in an estimate of about three quarters of the total generated content.
This alarming rate makes the development of adaptive spam detection techniques
a very real and pressing need. In this paper, we analyze the spam content of trend-
ing hashtags on Saudi Twitter, and assess the performance of previous spam detec-
tion systems on our recently gathered dataset. Due to the escalating manipulation
that characterizes newer spamming accounts, simple manual labeling currently
leads to inaccurate results. In order to get reliable ground-truth data, we propose
an updated manual classification algorithm that avoids the deficiencies of older
manual approaches. We also adapt the previously proposed features to respond to
spammers evading techniques, and use these features to build a new data-driven
detection system.
Keywords: Online Social Network, Spam Detection, Machine Learning,
Supervised Classification, Twitter
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1. Introduction
The rise of online social networks has marked the beginning of a new spam
era. Whether it is on Facebook, Twitter or other similar platforms, spam on on-
line social networks is characterized by its invasiveness, ubiquity, and interference
with the website’s main functionalities. The spammers’ aggressive abuse of online
social networks threatens of reducing the value and credibility of these platforms,
which may destroy their premise of an alternative, secure, and enjoyable online
existence.
The ubiquity of spam can greatly degrade the experience of the social net-
work user, replacing a human-human communication with an experience where
profit-oriented accounts, mostly bots, pollute the online sphere with insignificant,
context-less and even harmful content.
In our investigation, we found that about three quarters of the tweets in trend-
ing hashtags in Saudi Arabia are spam messages. A deeper analysis shows that the
percentage of tweets generated automatically is even higher. This not only means
that Twitter’s resources are being consumed by malicious accounts rather than the
intended users, but it also implies the need to doubt any statistics or opinion min-
ing results based on these trends. In particular, it becomes legitimate to question
the reports that rank Saudi Arabia as the arab nation with the highest number of
active Twitter users [1], or that show a “booming usage” with a penetration higher
than 51% [2].
While the first generation of spammers on Twitter was generally naive and
had obvious characteristics that helped separate it from the rest of the population,
spammers nowadays recur to cheap automated techniques to gain trust and cred-
ibility and go unnoticed in the larger crowd. Unlike emails spammers, spammers
on online social networks platforms have many evading dimensions, including the
most prominent feature that helped single them out in the near past: their social
network.
In this work, we study the contemporary population of spammers on Twitter,
specifically those that tweet in Arabic and that mainly hijack Saudi trends, and tar-
get the arabic speaking population. We develop new detection features that adapt
to the current evading techniques, and we use these features to train a Machine
Learning based system that has the goal of detecting spammers. We show that
our approach outperforms older state-of-the-art approaches, and is therefore more
adapted to the current detection needs.
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1.1. Contributions and outline
We summarize the contributions of this work in the following points:
• We take a fresh look on an old methodology applied extensively to Twitter.
We reuse the statistical supervised classification methodology and revise all
assumptions and steps in it. We follow a data-driven approach, and choose to
base our changes on empirical evaluation of the data rather than hypothetical
reasoning.
• We provide unique statistics on the prevalence of spam and automation in
trending hashtags written in arabic. Previous work has mainly targeted en-
glish and chinese spam [3, 4], and we hope that this work will contribute to
a greater understanding of non-english spam.
• We propose an updated manual classification algorithm that avoids the de-
ficiencies of older approaches and takes into account the automation status
of the account in question.
• We evaluate the performance of three - highly cited - state of the art spam
detection systems on recent data.
• We evaluate previously proposed detection features, and assess the impact
of evasion techniques on these features.
• We Propose a set of features that are most suitable to the detection of the
current Twitter’s spammers population.
• We propose a hunter unit that works in adjunction to our main classification
unit. This special unit is used to increase the probability of having spammers
in the sample. It takes advantage of the social network of spammers that the
system has already detected.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In part II we cover the back-
ground on spammers detection on Twitter, we start by introducing Twitter and
covering related work on spam detection. We then proceed to the discussion of
how to define spam and spammers. Part III is dedicated to data crawling and la-
beling. In part IV we explain in detail how the features are computed and how
they respond to different evasion techniques. The architecture of the system is dis-
cussed in part V. In part VI, we show the results and performance of our classifier
and compare it to the performance of other state-of-the-art systems. We conclude
the paper in part VI, where we also discuss future research directions.
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2. Background and Related Work
2.1. The Twitter social network
Twitter is an online social network and microblogging platform allowing its
users to write and read tweets, which are texts limited by 140 characters that can
optionally contain a URL or an image. The tweets of a user appear on his personal
page, and in the news feed of his followers. Accounts are public by default, mean-
ing that anyone accessing a user’s personal page can see his tweets feed. A user
can choose to make his account protected, in which case only his followers can
see his feed.
Unlike Facebook’s friendship relation, following on Twitter is not necessarily
bidirectional: A user i can follow user j without j following him back. In this
scenario, i is a “follower” of j and j is a “friend” (or alternatively a “followee”)
of i.
A user i can mention another user j (not necessarily a friend of i), by in-
cluding its user screen name preceded by the ’@’ symbol in the tweet. The same
convention also appears in any reply to a tweet by j.
Interaction with other accounts’ tweets has mainly two channels: the first
is “favouriting” the tweet (loosely equivalent to liking it on other online social
network platforms)1. The second interaction method is known as “retweeting”.
Retweeting means sharing the tweet on the user’s own page, while keeping the
reference to the tweet’s original writer.
A hashtag is a special text entity that may be formed by one or several words
preceded by the “#” symbol. Including a special hashtag in a tweet means link-
ing it to all the tweets that contain the same hashtag. This allows communities
to grow around hashtags, and allows the discussion and follow up of specific
events by searching Twitter for all tweets containing the relevant hashtag. When a
given hashtag gains a lot of popularity and activity in a given region, it becomes a
“trend”, and will show on the Twitter page of users in that region.
Since the number of characters in a tweet is limited, URLs shortening was a
common practice in the early days of Twitter. This has the advantage of saving
space, but also prevents a user from suspecting that a link is malicious before
clicking on it. Nowadays, links are automatically shortened by Twitter, but the
practice is still used by some users, mostly to hide the original URL [5].
1Recently, Twitter has renamed “favourite” to “like”, but we will be using the old terminology
throughout the paper since the work was done before the change took place.
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Manual ways to deal with unwanted attention from some accounts, or to report
malicious activity, include blocking an account and reporting it.
2.2. Related Work
Previous work on spam detection on Twitter can be typically divided into de-
scriptive and reactive approaches. Reactive work can be further divided based
on the used methodology. Our work is built on the machine learning supervised
classification model. The same methodology has been previously used in many
studies to detect spammers in the population of normal OSN accounts. The work
flow is pretty unified and can be summarized as follows: gathering and analyzing a
dataset representing the OSN accounts population, creating ground-truth data us-
ing a sample of the initial dataset, heuristically defining and selecting appropriate
classification features, building a statistical classifier, and assessing the perfor-
mance of the classifier on the manually labeled dataset, and optionally on a larger
non-labeled dataset.
Details of the approach differ and there exist different methods to collect the
data. One method is to attract spammers using social honeypots. These are ac-
counts created by the researchers to mimic the average user of the studied social
network [6, 7, 8]. This approach requires a long duration (spanning months) of
inactive observation before a satisfactory users database is built. The resulting
spammers dataset is often biased, as it only comprises spammers that are actively
following other users. Following other users in the hope of being seen or followed
back is a characteristic of spammers, but it does not apply to the entire spammers
population. For example, a sizable portion of the contemporary spammers pop-
ulation ensures visibility by hijacking hashtags and spreading their tweets there.
Additionally, the growing followers and retweets selling market allows spamming
accounts to “appear” popular without engaging in a complicated massive follow-
ing/unfollowing behavior.
The honeypots method has the additional disadvantage of yielding a dataset
that is skewed toward spammers, and does not represent their actual percentage in
the larger OSN population. Since normal users rarely follow other users randomly,
it is expected that normal users will be under-represented in the gathered dataset,
therefore requiring additional sampling of the OSN to equilibrate the dataset.
A more active approach is to collect users directly either by brute force [9]
or by sampling the Twitter sphere. The latter approach involves choosing a small
sample of users as a seed, and expanding the network by following the social net-
works of these users up to a given degree [10]. Yet another fast collection method
is to sample accounts that are tweeting in Twitter’s public timeline [11, 6] (now
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discontinued), or in trending hashtags [10]. Another efficient method is to use
Twitter’s streaming API [12] to collect a large dataset of tweets [13].
Compared to other collection methods, social honeypots have the advantage of
continuously collecting up-to-date evidence on content polluters from the social
network without the need for a human inspecting the gathered data [8]. One can
argue against this point of view, however, using the observation that benign users
may follow honeypot accounts for non-malicious reasons such as the desire of
being followed back, or a genuine desire to connect with the account [6]. Thus,
users following honeypots may well require human inspection of their profiles
before being considered malicious accounts.
How the ground-truth data is labeled is another issue. To complicate things
further, the research does not agree on a unified definition of a spam tweet, or a
spammer. Some approaches infer the spamming status of an account by assessing
only one tweet of that account [9], others require that a given percentage of the
tweets (such as 10%) are spam tweets [14], and some do not give an exact thresh-
old to exactly reproduce their chosen approach, but the total number of examined
tweets per account is provided, e.g. 20 [15].
What constitutes a spam message is another complexity dimension. Is it a
tweet containing a malicious URL? If an account repeats the same tweet a given
amount of times, is this tweet considered a spam? What are the conditions to
consider that an advertisement tweet is a spam?
Some approaches have assessed the safety or suspiciousness of URLs in tweets
as a mean to detect spam tweets [5, 16, 17, 18]. Although rigorous methods were
used to build these detection systems, tweets containing URLs form a limited
fraction of spam tweets, and containing a safe URL does not mean the tweet is a
legitimate, non spam message. This will be discussed further in section 2.3.
More recent work has investigated the relationship between automation and
spamming. In [19] for example, a system for automated spammers detection is de-
scribed. Features related to automation have been exploited to adapt to the chang-
ing structure of Twitters spammers population [14]. An analysis of automated
activity on Twitter is presented on [20], and a system that detects the automation
of an account is described in [21].
In [22], authors analyze the spammers’ social network on Twitter.
Spam detection has also been studied on other social networks, such as online
video social networks [23], social bookmarking sites [24], location-based social
networks [25] and other online social networks e.g. Facebook [26].
The dominating methodology in the work we discussed so far is the supervised
classification methodology. Other approaches require little human expert involve-
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ment and use graph and time based parameters to cluster and detect malicious
activity on social networks [27, 28].
2.3. Defining spam tweets and spammers accounts
It is easy to get overwhelmed by the variety of automated activity on Twitter.
And although most of this activity is malicious, it cannot be directly associated
with spam. There is a disagreement on what constitutes a spam tweet or a spam ac-
count in the research community, and different papers focus on different aspects of
spam. Twitter in particular, has an extensive definition of what defines a spammer
in its Terms of Service [29]. This extensive definition gives Twitter the flexibility
of dealing with what it assesses as malicious activity, but does not give definitive
answers on whether a given account that achieves some of the characteristics in
Twitter’s definition is actually a spammer. In fact, some of the characteristics may
well apply to a legitimate user.
For these reasons, we explicitly give our definition of spam on Twitter. This
definition is narrower than Twitter’s broad definition, but both more concise and
general than the definitions given by earlier work on the subject [23, 6, 11].
Before proceeding to the definition of a spamming account, we give here our
definition of a spam tweet. A tweet is considered a spam tweet if it satisfies the
following condition:
1. It contains a hashtag, a mention, a URL or an image.
2. And it is out of context. This can apply to the following overlapping defini-
tions:
• The tweet topic is not related to the hashtag/trend it contains. The topic
can be inferred from the text or the image.
• The URL redirects to a page not related to the tweet text or the tweet
hashtag.
• The URL redirects to a malicious/phishing site.
• The tweet is advertising a product or a service by hijacking hashtags
or mentioning users in an automated way.
In addition to this definition, and as of Twitters rule, we consider any tweet
advertising a paid retweet/favorite service or selling followers to be a spam as
well, regardless of whether it contains an entity (URL/hashtag/mention) or not.
A spam tweet can be tweeted by an account that is human-operated, bot-
operated or a mixture of these two types. We consider any automated account
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that tweets spam to be a spammer. A more careful examination of the account
should be done if it is not totally automated, that is if a fraction of the account
tweets is tweeted by a human. It may be the case that the human account has been
compromised by one of the malicious applications it subscribed to (more details
in the following sections).
Unlike previous approaches that assessed a tweet by the “safety” of links it
contains (using Google Safe Browsing (GSB) for example) [30], we do not con-
sider the URL to be a vital part of a spam tweet. We back this choice with em-
pirical evidence: 79.6% of spam messages in our dataset do not contain a URL,
yet they still exhibit the same degree of content pollution of a spam tweet contain-
ing a URL. We also sampled 5000 arabic spam tweets containing URLs, extracted
the URLs, followed the redirections of each individual URL and used Google Safe
Browsing API to flag malicious final webpages. Surprisingly, none of the URLs in
our sample was flagged as malicious. This could have many explanations, namely
that none of the webpages exhibited a phishing or malware spreading behavior, or
that the GSB API database did not contain yet the weblinks of suspected phish-
ing or malware pages at the time of our inspection. Regardless of the cause, these
empirical findings suggest that the classic definition of a spam tweet as a tweet
containing a URL that would be flagged by safe browsing services provides a very
skewed view of the spammers scenery on Twitter. Only a non-representative, tiny
fraction of the spammers population can be detected this way, therefore severely
biasing any further analysis or generalization.
In fact, we would like to argue that, just like email spam that does not contain
actionable content2, a spam message on Twitter can have motivations other than
having users click on a malicious link. An account that sells bags for example,
would include the image of its product in the spam tweet and let interested users
click on its username to be redirected to its account and eventually read its “about
me” section containing its contact information. This can also lead to users replying
to the tweet or privately sending a message to the seller account. The same model
applies to a variety of opportunistic accounts on Twitter. These include accounts
that sell followers, retweets, products and services. This new perspective on tweets
misuse offers a deeper and more realistic angle of the current forms and goals
of arabic spam on Twitter. Fig. 1 shows an example of a spam tweet, which is
misusing two unrelated hashtags. Its goal is to promote a followers selling service,
2A possible reason is detecting what emails will bounce and inferring what email accounts are
still active.
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and it does not include any URL in the tweet text.
Figure 1: A spam tweet that promotes a followers selling service by hijacking two unrelated trend-
ing hashtags. The tweet text says: ’[This is an] automatic retweet. Khaliji (Gulf-based) accounts.
Call [phone number]’. Note the high number of retweets and the random number added to the end
of the text.
3. Data Collection
3.1. Crawling Twitter
We used two main ways to collect our dataset. First, we used Twitter API to
crawl 7 trending hashtags in Saudi Arabia in the period between 26 November and
15 December 2014. This resulted in a dataset containing 319,390 unique tweets,
and 102,131 unique account identifiers. In addition, we used the streaming API
[12] on December 13, 2014 from 12:00 noon until 12:00 night UTC/GMT time,
and obtained 22,771,358 unique tweets generated by 1,816,668 unique account
identifiers. Table 1 summarizes the information of the crawled dataset.
Source Period Nb. of unique tweets Nb. of unique account IDs
7 trending hashtags in KSA 26 Nov - 15 Dec 2014 319,390 102,131
Twitter Streaming API Dec 13 2014 (12:00 noon - 12:00 night UTC) 22,771,358 1,816,668
Table 1: Crawled dataset information
3.2. Building the labeled dataset
To ensure that the labeled dataset contains a wealth of spammers (both in num-
bers and variation), we had to recur to a source that is known to attract spamming
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activity. We selected a trending hashtag related to an important sport event (the
22nd Arabian Gulf Cup final match) and pulled all the tweets that contained the
chosen related hashtag (see table 2 for details).
We randomly chose 10% of the 55,239 obtained tweets, and classified them
by mean of manual examination. 76.3% of the texts were classified as spam and
23.7% were classified as legitimate texts relevant to the hashtag context. For each
tweet, we pulled the related account IDs (including the original account ID that
generated the tweet and the retweeter account ID if existing). We then computed
an automation index for each account. Based on a combination of this index and
further manual investigation (details to follow), we classified these accounts as
spammers, non-spammers, and compromised accounts. The diagram in fig. 2 sum-
marizes the steps taken to obtain the labeled dataset.
Figure 2: Diagram of labeled dataset building.
Hashtag Nb. Of tweets Period Nb. of classified tweets % of spam tweets
Who’s behind the failure of
the saudi football team 55,239 26 to 27 Nov 2014 5255 73.6 %
Table 2: Information on the selected trending hashtag
3.3. Manual account classification algorithm
This paragraph is devoted to the description of our manual classification algo-
rithm. During our exploratory analysis of the gathered dataset, we found a need
for a detailed classification method that formalizes the ground-truth formation
step. This need stems from the fact that results based on simple classification ap-
proaches of tweets are often misguiding.
Aside from training datasets based on blacklists, suspended accounts lists [31],
or safe browsing services [14], any approach to create a labeled training dataset re-
quires an amount of manual classification. One direct approach to obtain a dataset
10
where the accounts are classified as spammers/non-spammers is to start from a
dataset containing tweet texts labeled as spam/not spam. The next step would be
to directly label the account as spammer if the associated tweet text is a spam,
and as a non-spammer otherwise [9]. This approach is direct and simple, but the
resulting dataset is far from being sufficiently clean. In fact, there are two cases
where the direct mapping can go wrong.
The first case is when the tweet text is not a spam: this does not guarantee that
the account that generated it is not a spammer. With the heavy masking behavior
that spammers use, it is only natural to find a proportion of their tweets to be
completely legitimate.
The other case is when a tweet is a spam, and the related account is not a spam-
mer. The account can be a human account (most tweets are non-automated) that
subscribed to a low-traffic app with occasional spamming behavior. We denote
this specific case as compromised account.
We first started by examining the source of each tweet in the most recent 200
tweets of the account. The source of the tweet cannot be seen on the user’s in-
terface of Twitter, but a developer can access it through API. It is a text field in
the pulled description of the tweet that contains two values: a description of the
source of the tweet, and a URL pointing to the website that operates the source.
The source can be one of Twitter’s official sources (such as the web client, the
mobile web, an official mobile device application, etc...), a trusted source (such as
the Echofon Android application), or a random source that generates automated
tweeting activity. Note that the manual classification of the tweets sources into
these categories (that we defined) requires an individual understanding of the his-
tory and status of each source, and an extensive investigation of its associated
URL (if provided). Examining each source is a time-consuming job, and meth-
ods to automatically assess the trustworthiness of a source may prove to be useful
since a static dictionary will probably become quickly outdated. In fact, we had
more than 300 distinct sources in our 300k tweets dataset.
To illustrate the ratio of automation in trending hashtags, we chose a rather
small hashtag and plotted the number of tweets of each source appearing in this
hashtag (see fig 3). Despite having a limited number of tweets, this hashtag clearly
illustrates the observation that most of the activity is generated by random auto-
mated sources rather than human-related sources. More popular hashtags attract
a much more aggressive automated activity, and the associated barplot quickly
becomes crowded and unintelligible.
Some human-operated accounts subscribe to automated applications resulting
in a fraction of their feed being generated by automated sources. We considered
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Figure 3: Barplot showing the percentage of content generated by different sources in a trending
hashtag containing 3,782 tweets.
an account “automated” if more than 80% of its feed was generated by automated
sources.
Fig. 4 summarizes the approach we took to move from our labeled texts dataset
to a labeled accounts dataset. The main dogma we followed was two fold and can
be summarized as follows:
1. If the evidence (the labeled text) shows that an automated account is a spam-
mer, take the evidence and consider the automated account to be a spammer.
If it shows it as a non spammer investigate the account tweets further before
accepting the verdict.
2. If the evidence (the labeled text) shows a human as a non spammer, take the
evidence. If it shows it as a spammer, investigate the account’s page further
to see if the spamming behavior is constant or may just be a slipping or an
impulsive retweet.
This method allows us to verify the status of suspicious accounts without hav-
ing to go manually through all the accounts to ensure the verdict of the labeled
texts dataset. Thus it provides a compromise between the accuracy of manually
inspecting the accounts (assessing around 200 tweets per account) and the speed
of assessing only one tweet (as it has been used in works such as [9, 22]).
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Figure 4: Account classification diagram.
4. Features
4.1. Profile attributes
Using features related to the social network of a profile is a legacy of the
earlier work on spam detection. This explains why a lot of evading techniques
have the exact aim of evading these features. These features include the number of
followers, the number of friends, and the relationship between these two variables,
which can be captured using different expressions:
1. The simple followers per friends ratio: nb(followers)
nb(friends)
2. an alternative ratio measure nb(friends)
nb(followers)2
3. Reputation nb(followers)
nb(friends)+nb(followers)
In addition to the static numbers, we can also look at these measures in time
by computing the number of followers (resp. friends) acquired per day. Since the
information on when each relationship was created is not available, we used the
age of the account as the time period over which these relationships were created.
Hence, the obtained value is the mean value over time:
nb/day(followers) =
nbtotal(followers)
agedays(account)
Other general features of the account include the total number of tweets, the num-
ber of lists containing the account, the number of tweets favorited by the account,
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the age of the account, and its tweeting frequency (the average number of tweets
generated per day), computed as:
nbtotal(tweets)
agedays(account)
We noticed, however, that some spamming accounts trick both the age and the
tweeting frequency features by remaining relatively idle for an extended amount
of time after the creation of the account. Similarly, recently compromised accounts
that have been “normally” active for a long time have a “clean” history that makes
their overall temporal features rather normal. Thus, we introduced the “recent
tweeting frequency”, which computes the frequency over the last 200 tweets only.
The former frequency will be denoted as the “global tweeting frequency”.
4.2. Content attributes
Content attributes are based on the recent activity of the profile, namely the
last 200 tweets. This specific number is chosen because it is the maximum tweets
count that can be obtained using only one API call. Obtaining more than this num-
ber would require more API calls, leading to a longer extraction time. Therefore,
200 tweets seems like a rational choice that wisely uses available resources.
That said, spamming accounts created by the more involved spamming cam-
paigns are usually heavily multi-sourced. This means that their tweets are gen-
erated by several automatic - possibly independent - tweeting engines. Some of
these sources can be legitimate automatic sources that have a low frequency traf-
fic. This type of sources is usually also used by normal non-spamming accounts.
The typical content contains quotes, sayings, prayers, jokes, etc... Other types of
automatic tweeting scripts that lay on the darker side of the gray spectrum include
sources with higher traffic, that are based on custom libraries of thousands of
ready-to-use tweets. These sources are often used in conjunction with spamming
and advertising sources, usually to mask the spamming content of the account
(sybil or compromised) in question.
The most general descriptors of a profile’s content are the rates of retweets,
replies and of original tweets (they sum to 1). These attributes assess the inter-
action of the account with its environment and how much of its content is self-
generated. On the tweet level, we computed the minimum, maximum, median and
average number of words per tweet.
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4.2.1. Entities-related attributes
We will use “entity” to denote the non natural language parts of the tweet,
namely hashtags, URLs and mentions. It is natural to expect that the distributions
of usage of these entities is different between spammers and non-spammers. We
therefore use several features formulations to capture this difference.
On the global level (over the most recent 200 tweets), 3 features can be ex-
tracted: the proportion of tweets with URLs, hashtags and mentions, respectively.
In addition, since spammers tend to repeat the same URL, hashtag or mention in
their tweets for advertisement and visibility reasons, we compute the number of
unique entities and the average number of times a unique entity is used. For URLs
for example, a normal user is expected to have an average usage of 1 per url,
meaning that he used each unique URL only once. A spammer on the other hand
tends to have a much higher average usage per unique URL. We use the following
expression to compute this value:
nb(URLs)
nb(unique(URLs))
Note that the unshortened final URL is used, since the shortened URL will be
different each time the tweet is generated.
The existence of these entities can be also assessed on the individual tweet
level by computing the minimum, maximum, median and average number of oc-
currences of each type of these entities in a tweet. For example, we can compute
the average number of hashtags per tweet (computed by averaging this measure
over the most recent 200 tweets). The number of features obtained this way is 12
(4× 3). We also computed the same measures per word per tweet, increasing the
number of features to 24.
A technique used by spammers to mask their heavy use of a limited number
of entities is to mimic a normal user’s behavior by introducing other entities and
using them only once. This decreases the average number of uses of an entity,
gearing it toward a value close to that of a legitimate user. To account for this
behavior, we introduce the “diversity index”, usually used in ecological and social
sciences to measure the adjusted number of species in a population, while taking
into account that these species must be evenly distributed. We use the following
“True Diversity” expression to compute the diversity index 1/
∑
i p
2
i , where pi
denotes the rate of usage of an entity i .
For example, a spammer who has used a hashtag h1 147 times, and 20 other
hashtags once each, will have the number of unique hashtags equal to 21, while
his hashtag diversity index will be close to one (precisely 1.29), thus reflecting the
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true diversity of hashtags in his tweets. Another example is a legitimate user who
used 9 URLs, once each. This user will have his URLs diversity index equal to
the number of unique URLs (9), since the probability of usage of each URL is the
same.
Note that this behavior can also be the result of the evolved spamming ac-
counts being multi-sourced. Some of the sources generating the content of the
spamming account act like a ”white noise”, with a content that is closer to normal
than to spamming behavior.
We compute the diversity index for URLs, hashtags and mentions. And we use
the result to compute an adjusted value of the average number of uses of each of
these entities.
4.2.2. Content replication
In addition to entities replication discussed in the last section, one of the most
prominent features of spamming accounts is the replication of the tweet text itself
(possibly with different URL/hashtag/mention each time). Most of the spamming
accounts are automated, they can’t be as original and random as a human, and
unless they have a really diversified spam content, this feature is in essence non-
evadable. In practice, however, spammers use a number of evading techniques
such as masking the replication with automatically generated legitimate content.
Another evading technique aims at tricking the similarity measure by adding
artificial (meaningless) variation to the tweet text (such as the random three let-
ters word ’ibf’). That’s why we use our own definition of similarity based on the
Levenshtein edit distance (rather than checking if the two texts are completely
identical). To ensure that the similarity is computed on the core text of the tweet
and doesn’t take into account variables, we filtered the tweet text by removing
any hashtag, URL, or mention (including the retweet special identifier ’RT’). Due
to these two evasion factors, this feature is not currently as efficient as it was in
detecting spammers.
A tweet text is considered a duplicate of another if the similarity is higher than
90%. This threshold misses some duplicates that are carefully twisted (especially
if the tweets are semantic duplicates3 rather than syntactic replicates [14]) but is
still able to detect the duplicates that evade the rigid (exact) similarity measure.
Techniques to add artificial difference to the tweet include adding a random or
3We have not encountered semantic duplicates in our arabic tweets dataset. We think the cause
is the lack of services similar to Spinbot [32] in arabic.
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iterated number to the tweet (incremented by one each time the same tweet is
generated), or adding randomly generated short words (such as xjl, jz1, qic).
The basic features related to this are:
1. the average similarity computed as:∑
ti,tj∈T,i<j similarity(ti, tj)
|T ||T − 1|/2
where T represents the tweets extracted from the account.
2. the number of replicates (the number of tweets tweeted before by the ac-
count).
In practice, the average similarity measure is of little help, it does not clearly
capture the replication aspect of an account. The number of replicates is relatively
robust, since the existence of replicated content cannot be wiped by the the auto-
mated masking activity. However, if the account is a high-frequency account, and
uses masking abundantly and spamming occasionally, replication can be missed
(due to the 200 tweets limitation).
4.2.3. Content reputation
The reputation of a specific tweet can be assessed using two measures, the
number of times it was retweeted, and the number of times it was favorited. A
tweet acquires a reputation if its content is relevant to a lot of people, or if the
account that generated it is famous/important. When neither of these conditions
explain the high reputation of a tweet, this reputation can be alternatively ex-
plained by an automated retweeting/favoriting activity, which is generally closely
related to spam content.
To capture tweet reputation we extracted features that measure the statistics
over 200 tweets of an account, namely the minimum, maximum, median and av-
erage number of retweets and favorites per tweet (8 features in total).
4.2.4. Spam dictionary
A feature that is directly inspired by spam detection in emails, measures the
proportion of tweets containing a word from a spam dictionary. Since the masking
behavior can dramatically decrease the proportion of spam tweets in a spamming
account, applying this feature on an account content may not be helpful in detect-
ing complex spamming accounts.
An arabic dictionary for spam terms is not readily available. In addition, spam
on Twitter does not appear to have the same lexicon of emails’ spam. Therefore we
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created a dictionary based on the spam tweets in our labeled dataset. The obtained
list was manually filtered, and only the most frequent and relevant words were
kept.
5. Classification
5.1. Building a spam classifier
The targeted classifier is a binary classifier that outputs one of two results:
spammer or non-spammer. The core classifier unit in fig. 5 is fed with the fea-
tures extracted from the account. A machine learning algorithm decides the output
based on the values of the features. And in the case where a spammer is detected,
the account details are sent to a “hunter” unit that extracts the social network of
the account, and feeds the obtained accounts back to the classifier.
Figure 5: Working system architecture.
5.2. Training methodology and evaluation metrics
We train several ML algorithms on our labeled data: AdaBoost, Decorate, Ran-
dom Forest and Naive Bayes. Due to the limited size of the dataset, our best option
is to perform a 10-fold cross validation training over the labeled dataset. We assess
the performance in terms of the false positive rate, the recall and the F1-measure
of the spammers class.
5.3. Getting more spammers, the Hunter unit
A direct consequence of the evasion techniques developed by the spamming
community, is the heavy clustering of spammers. To give each other credibility,
spammers need to follow each other, and to favorite/retweet the content of their
peers. Finding a spammer account is therefore equivalent to finding a mine of
spammers. By constructing the social network of a spammer, namely his follow-
ers and the accounts that retweet his content, we can add a high-prior list to the
accounts dataset fed to the classifier, and increase the overall number of detected
spammers.
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5.4. Feature selection
We use the information gain and the Chi squared selection techniques to select
the features to use in our classifier. We obtain the same set of top 20 features
from the 2 techniques. After removing correlated features that refer to very similar
measures, we are left with the set in fig. 6, to which we add the “average number
of retweets per tweet” feature.
tweeting frequency per day
proportion of replies
nb. replicates
fraction of tweets with mentions
adjusted nb. of uses of url
nb. of hashtags per day
adjusted nb. of uses of hashtag
nb. mentions
nb. mentions per day
adjusted nb. of uses of mention
min nb. words per tweet
max nb. mentions per tweet
avg nb. mentions per word in the tweet
+ avg nb. retweets per tweet
Figure 6: The chosen set of features
6. Results
Using a 10-fold cross validation over our labeled dataset, we obtained the per-
formance of four Machine Learning algorithms in detecting spammers accounts,
namely Naive Bayes, Random Forest, AdaBoost and Decorate. We used Weka’s
implementation of these algorithms, and repeated the process over four different
sets of features: Our selected set of features denoted as “Ours”, the set in [9] de-
noted as “Benevenuto”, the set in [6] denoted as “Stringhini”, and the set in [11]
denoted as “Wang”.
In order to exactly reproduce a classification system described in a previous
work, one should possess three key information: 1) the statistical model used to
build the classifier, 2) the set of features extracted from the dataset 3) the ini-
tial training and testing datasets used to train and test the model (or possibly one
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dataset with a reproducible way to re-partition it according to the exact authors’
method). After obtaining the exact parameters of the model, it can be used there-
after to classify new instances (preferably drawn from current data), and assess
the current performance of the model.
Since we did not have access to the initial datasets of the authors in the cited
work [6, 11] 4, we reproduced their work using the different sets of features de-
scribed in their respective papers.
Note that the compared models have been trained over recent data. Therefore,
their performance as shown in this manuscript are actually a higher bound of their
real performance. We expect that the initial models - with the same sets of features
- trained over their original respective datasets would have a significantly worse
performance over our current test data. Should we have access to the original
datasets, two conclusions could be drawn:
• The statistical characteristics of the spamming population have significantly
shifted.
• The set of features usable in classifying malicious activity needs to be up-
dated.
These two factors can be independent. The spammers’ population can change
their behavior, making an old detection system ineffective. Though retraining the
model with the same set of features over newer data can adjust the model’s pa-
rameters and make it effective again.
Our analysis shows that, in drifting away from their old behavioral models,
spammers have both changed their statistical description and the features that are
effective in catching them.
We report the results over three performance measures following the style in
[14]: the false positives rate (fig. 7), the recall (fig. 8), and the F-measure (fig. 9).
Compared to other features sets, our set and that of Benevenuto [9] show a
significantly higher performance in all performance measures. In addition, our
set’s performance matches or slightly surpasses that of Benevenuto. This is an
expected result due to the high similarity between our set of features selected by
Information Gain and Chi squared techniques, and the features set proposed in
[9].
4The dataset from [9] is available by direct request to the first author.
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Figure 7: False positives rate of the features set using 4 ML algorithms.
Figure 8: Recall rate of the features set using 4 ML algorithms.
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Figure 9: F-measure of the features set using 4 ML algorithms.
Although some prior work hinted at the importance of including automation
related features as a performance booster, we did not obtain a significant improve-
ment to the shown results by including a feature that explicitly states the automa-
tion status of the account (at least over our dataset). In other terms, we used our
prior manual classification of the accounts as bots or humans, and used the class
of each account as an input to the classifier. This did not result in a significant
improvement in the accuracy of the presented spam classification model. In fact,
it appears that the information brought by the automation feature is already in-
cluded in the selected set of features that we used. Concretely, in order to build an
automation detection classifier, the set of features to be used is highly overlapping
with the set of features presented in this paper.
Some important observations concerning previously formulated features (in
the literature) can be made. First, none of the naive features related to the social
network of an account (namely number of friends/followers and the different ra-
tios combinations) made it to the selected set of features (this can be explained by
the evading techniques such as spammers clustering, and followers buying). The
same can be said regarding the age (evaded partially by remaining idle for an ex-
tended period, or by compromising legitimate accounts), the number of tweets and
the similarity features (evaded using automatically generated, legitimate-looking
content). Even a rigid replicates measure can be easily evaded using artificial ran-
dom terms or spinning (the process of using semantic alternatives of a text, which
was not observed in our arabic dataset).
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In contrast, some content related features, including those that were first sug-
gested in [9], are still valid in detecting spammers. Nevertheless, a general ob-
servation is that, given the elaborated evasion techniques developed and used by
the spamming community, these content features alone are not enough to achieve
an adequate accuracy, and new features are therefore needed. In particular, the
used spam dictionary, being static in nature, cannot prove beneficial beyond the
time-limited dataset from which it was extracted. Having a spam dictionary that
can be effectively used as a detection feature requires building this dictionary in a
dynamic and environment-responsive way.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
Despite many spam detection works and years of improvement, spam is on
the rise in online social networks. Due to the active spamming community and
the ever-updating evasion techniques, most of the previously proposed detection
methods has become obsolete, and even the best performance comes short of what
is needed in a production system.
In this paper, we discussed spamming on Twitter, especially with regard to
arabic language spam. We presented a concise definition of spam and spammers,
and used it to propose a detailed reproducible manual classification algorithm that
takes into account the percentage of automated content in an account. We also pre-
sented the evasion techniques developed by spammers and how the features can be
adapted to account for the evasion effects. Using these features, we assessed the
performance of our approach compared to three previous approaches, and showed
that a small subset of features proposed in the literature is still valid. Although
these features are usable, the initial statistical model created based on these fea-
tures needs to be updated using recent data to account for spammers moving away
from their previous “statistical” definition.
Backed with the findings of this work, we think that research on spam detec-
tion on Twitter, including ours, has taken a limited approach to feature extraction,
and that detection needs to look at spammers as a community rather than individ-
ual accounts. Additionally, we think that the content of spamming accounts has
been barely considered since most approaches focus on detecting spammers as
opposed to detecting spam. Detecting spam may turn out to be more rewarding in
that a small spam seed will result in a mass detection of accounts that duplicated
this seed content [33]. Based on this, we plan to investigate the possible extension
of this work in three different directions.
23
(1) The temporal aspect of the tweets: Including a time component in the fea-
tures may help block evading techniques developed to evade from static features
that only look at raw numbers. In fact, an initial analysis showed that spammers
have a distinctive temporal pattern that may be either caused by automation, or
used to mask automation (depending on the considered observation period and
the account in question).
(2) Detecting spam based on text mining techniques and natural language pro-
cessing: What makes an account a spammer is the tweets content. When a human
looks at an account in an attempt to classify it, the main feature in determining his
decision is whether he finds an explicit spam content or not. Other features of the
account may give hints as to how suspicious the account seems or where to look
in the feed, but they do not form a convicting evidence. Previous work has looked
at this subject [9, 34, 35, 36], but our preliminary experiments show that there
is room for improvement. Aside from older models becoming obsolete, having a
spam dictionary is a crucial part of building a system to detect spam text. Yet,
relevant spam terms on social networks are constantly changing; thus imposing
the need for a more dynamic and time-dependent approach.
(3) A main difficulty of this work was that accounts cannot be cleanly di-
vided into spammers and non spammers. There is a gray area populated by au-
tomated accounts that generate low value content, and by compromised accounts
that were created and operated by actual human users before becoming manip-
ulated by spamming applications and campaigns [33]. In fact, most of the false
positives are accounts that belong to this area. We think that including more than
one type of content polluters as possible outputs to the classification systems may
help clear up some of the ambiguity, and help Twitter take a different course of
action for each type of accounts.
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